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modernity. Although some scholars argue that South Korea is now experiencing a Western type 
of modernity, others reject this assertion and argue that the country has not modernized at all. 
This paper attempts to investigate the dynamics and contradictions of capitalist development 
in Korea from a perspective of vertical modernization. It will consider the origin, process and 
outcomes of modernization, mainly in terms of democracy, economic growth and welfare. It 
argues that there are different sites and forms of modernity in the world, and that South Korea 
would be a good candidate to examine a non-Western modernity. It contends that the country’s 
modernity has been distorted and unbalanced in the development of society, culture, politics 
and economy. Historically, South Korea has gone through traditional unmodernity, colonial 
undermodernity and Western modernity. A clear examination of the country’s development 
experience reveals the complex nature of modernity in that tradition, as well as how modernity 
and postmodernity coexist with one another in the present time. It concludes that South Korean 
modernity is an incomplete project.
The US-Korea Institute (USKI) at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 
Johns Hopkins University, works to increase information and understanding of Korea and Korean 
affairs. USKI’s efforts combine innovative research with a repertoire of outreach activities and 
events that encourage the broadest possible debate and dialogue among scholars, policymakers, 
students, NGO and business leaders, and all those with an interest in the Korean peninsula. USKI 
also sponsors the Korea Studies Program at SAIS, a growing policy studies program preparing 
the next generation of leaders in the field of Korean affairs. For more information, visit www.
uskoreainstitute.org.
Copyright © 2015 by the US-Korea Institute at SAIS
Printed in the United States of America
www.uskoreainstitute.org
All rights reserved, except that authorization is given herewith to academic institutions and 
educators to reproduce articles herein for academic use as long as appropriate credit is given both 
to the authors and to this publication.
THE US-KOREA INSTITUTE AT SAIS
ABSTRACT
US-Korea Institute Working Paper
3
I. Introduction
Korea’s1 experience with industrialization and democratization distinguishes it from other 
developing countries. The country has transformed itself from rural to industrial to an 
information society at an unprecedented rate. However, this success has not been without side 
effects. Korea is now poised to join the ranks of advanced core countries in the international 
stratification system. Global customers use Korean-made cars and electronics including mobile 
phones. International audiences are entertained by Korean popular culture, also known as the 
Korean Wave (Hallyu), which is represented by songs and dramas. Yet, these audiences are also 
shocked by news of the tragic sinking of the Sewol ferry that resulted in the deaths of several 
hundred high school students. 
The dynamics and complexities of capitalist development in Korea are closely related to its 
past experiences. At the dawn of foreign imperial encroachment, capitalism in Korea was 
not established well enough to bring in autogenous development. Additionally, its modern 
history was plagued by Japanese colonization, American and Soviet occupation, and a civil 
war leading to the permanent division of the country. After its liberation from Japan in 1945, 
Korea embarked upon capitalistic development characterized by economic and political 
achievements. However, the remarkable economic growth and structural change were also 
accompanied by disarticulation and dependency. Korea’s economy is highly dependent upon 
foreign capital, technology and resources, and there remains a discrepancy between the country’s 
internationalized sector and traditional sector. Furthermore, Korea has not yet consolidated 
democracy; its democracy is only partially institutionalized because there is minimal separation 
of power among its executive, legislative and judiciary branches. 
There are a variety of conflicting arguments concerning the underlying nature of modernity in 
Korea. Western scholarship has looked at Korea as an ideal place for an ‘emergent modernity’ 
(Tiryakian 1990) leading to ‘second modernity’ (Berger 1988), following a Western prototype. 
Unlike Western scholarship, however, Korean scholarship is somewhat critical of modernity 
materializing in Korea. Lim (1995) asserts that Korea has not been modernized at all by a 
Western standard. In line with this assertion, Kim and Chung (1996) claim that modernity is 
distorted as a result of Western domination and should be replaced by an alternative form of 
modernity. In recent years, some scholars maintain that modernity can be deconstructed by a 
discourse of postmodernity, while others refute this idea with the argument that postmodernity 
does not take the positive and negative sides of modernity into consideration.2
This paper aims to readdress the underlying nature of modernity in Korea and demonstrate 
that the coexistence of tradition, modernity and postmodernity in time and space is essential to 
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understanding modern Korea. For this purpose, this paper is divided into six parts. Following 
the introduction, Section II unravels a theoretical underpinning of modernity discussed in the 
Korean context. Section III extends the theoretical discussion of the previous section by focusing 
on the dynamics and contradictions of Korean modernity. Section IV explores the major features 
of Korea’s capitalist development in the context of ‘vertical modernization,’ closely examining 
its process of industrialization and democratization. Section V attempts to locate the Korean 
experience of capitalist development in the context of ‘quasi-modernity.’ The concluding section 
summarizes the findings and raises unanswered questions for future research. 
II. Explaining the Relationship among Tradition, Modernity and Postmodernity 
Throughout history, humankind has passed from traditional forms of society (i.e., agricultural) 
through modernity (i.e., industrialization) to a postmodern society (i.e., information/knowledge-
based). One must admit, however, that this is nothing more than an ideal or simply a result of 
time passing. Although advanced capitalist countries might have moved toward this direction, 
at present they face a mixture of tradition, modernity and postmodernity. In particular, in most 
developing countries, tradition still shapes modernity, and postmodernity takes place partially 
amid conflicts between tradition and modernity. 
Earlier modernization theories assumed that tensions and discord existed between tradition 
and modernity in any given developing country. It was found by later modernization theories, 
however, that in many developing countries, tradition constrains modernization. Modernization 
can thus be seen as a multi-linear process in which a different mixture of tradition and modernity 
is involved, depending on a country’s specific socio-historical condition. Moore’s seminal 
work on comparative modernization in France, England, Germany, Japan, Russia and China 
has convincingly shown that there are capitalist, fascist and socialist paths to the modern world 
(Moore 1968).
In existing literature, there is no coherent, unified theory of postmodernity.3 Postmodernist 
theories presume that postmodernity is an antithesis to modernity; modernity seeks grand 
narratives concerned with nation, state, and class, while postmodernity embraces small 
narratives engaged in issues of gender, generation and ethnicity. Postmodernist theories envisage 
modernity as an outgrowth of Enlightenment, which suppresses human beings from deviating 
from the original ideal of liberation. Paradoxically, modernity is associated with the crisis of 
reason and freedom in the modern age.4 
The single most important merit of postmodernist theories lies in the potential ability of 
relativizing all modernist theories as grand narratives. As far as development theories are 
concerned, modernization theory and dependency theory5 are grand narratives, even though 
they move away from each other in terms of ideological orientation and mode of explanation. 
Indeed, they provide diametrically opposed diagnoses of underdevelopment and prescriptions 
for development, which can fall into a general scheme of either capitalism or socialism. 
Postmodernist theories can contribute towards deconstructing the myth and reality of capitalist 
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or socialist development in (former) Third World countries.6 For them, development should be 
considered “heterogeneous, contested, impure [and] hybrid” (Escobar 2000, 12). 
Nonetheless, there are certain weaknesses in postmodernist theories. One of the flaws is the fact 
that these theories presuppose a break between modernity and postmodernity. By denying the 
stark fact that postmodernity follows modernity, they do not sufficiently take into consideration 
continuity between modernity and postmodernity. Postmodernist theories also tend to 
overemphasize the structural problems of modernity and underestimate its material and cultural 
achievements. It is hard to consent that postmodernity can emerge in the absence of modernity. 
Based on the discussion above, this paper agrees with the conceptualization of modernity as a 
historical social formation (Wagner 2001, 2012). This conceptualization leads us to argue that 
“there have been a number of different sites and forms of modernity” in the world (Robertson 
and Khondker 1998, 31).7 The idea of multiple modernities is predicated upon three interrelated 
assumptions: tradition as an active agent in defining the modernization process, the relevance 
of non-Western civilizations for the understanding of Western modernity, and the global 
significance of local knowledge (Tu 2000, 19). It opens up the possibility of grappling with 
the formation, change, disintegration, and reformation of various Western and non-Western 
modernities from a comparative perspective. 
According to Eisenstadt (2001), modernity is a distinct civilization. Although modernity first 
crystallized in Western Europe in human history, other non-Western countries have developed a 
multitude of modernity following the Western prototype of modernity. The history of modernity 
can be seen as a process of the constitution and reconstitution of various cultural and institutional 
programs of modernity. Eisenstadt also comments that institutional and cultural contours 
of modernity are subject to continuous change, due to a combination of factors: the internal 
dynamics of the technological, economic, political and cultural arenas; the political struggles 
and confrontations between different regions, states, and locales; the shifting hegemony in the 
international system; the conflicts between the elites and masses; and the like (Eisenstadt 2001, 
331-332).
So far, mainstream Western scholarship has supposed that modernity is a Western project 
(Giddens 1990). Even though Giddens rejects the basic idea of postmodernity as the end point 
of history, his notion of ‘radicalized modernity’ in a continuum between simple modernity and 
high modernity is drawn entirely from Western European and North American development 
experiences. It is true that modernity first appeared in Western Europe, spread to other parts 
of Europe, then moved on to North America, and later to Latin America, Africa and Asia. The 
spread of modernity has been a contradictory process throughout the world: in some cases, 
Western modernity emerged as a new form of modernity combined with tradition, while in other 
cases Western modernity destroyed native traditions for the benefit of a new modernity. Even in 
Western Europe, modernity at the outset developed into ‘restricted liberal modernity’ as a form 
of bourgeois utopia, and currently has not yet reached the stage of ‘extended liberal modernity’ 
that enables the full inclusion of all members of society (Wagner 1994). The former Soviet 
US-Korea Institute Working Paper
6
Union and Eastern European countries also provided ‘socialist modernity’ as an alternative to 
‘capitalist modernity.’ Furthermore, I can witness a range of variations in capitalist modernity 
across the world: Anglo-Saxon, Rhenish, Swedish, Japanese or Singaporean versions of 
capitalist modernity.
III. The Dynamics of Korean Modernity
In the case of Korea, another variant of modernity can be witnessed. Korea is a case in which not 
only tradition and postmodernity coexist in the present, but also modernity and antimodernity 
simultaneously coexist: traditional beliefs and symbols interact with modern, foreign institutions 
and cultures; capitalist modernity is challenged by socialist or other forms of anti-capitalist 
modernity; and postmodern trends and phenomena live together with traditional or modern 
values and practices. Figure 1 illustrates Korea’s position in the world timeline.
Figure 1. Korea Position in the World Timeline.
One of the difficulties involved in investigating the underlying nature of modernity in Korea is 
the fact that current discourse on modern, modernity or modernization originated from a unique 
historical experience of Western European development. During the 18th and 19th century, 
Western Europe underwent far-reaching societal changes that culminated in modernization of 
economy, politics, society and culture. This modernization process of Western Europe entailed 
a large-scale capitalist expansion to the hinterland of the world through imperialism and 
colonialism. The development of Western Europe was accompanied by the underdevelopment 
of the rest of the world, including Korea. It is in this context that the world as a whole entered a 
time period that I usually call “modern.” After all, modernity consists of standards generalized 
from Western European development experiences (Lim 1995, 190-193).8
In order to overcome this Europocentric bias of social science, I utilized a post-colonial 
discourse to reformulate a system of knowledge produced in Western Europe and North America 
(Pieterse and Parekh 1995).9 Post-colonial discourse can be emancipating, as it criticizes the 
ideas and practices of the existing concept of modernity as a Western construct. I hope to 
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reconstruct the concept of modernity so that it may be analyzed in its width and breadth across 
time and space in the world.
As already mentioned, in Korea, I detect a coexistence of tradition, modernity, antimodernity and 
postmodernity. This leads to the question: Which kind of modernity prevails in Korea? In order 
to answer this question, I conceptualize some subtypes of modernity. For the sake of brevity, I 
analytically define three types of modernity: unmodernity, undermodernity and modernity.10 In 
traditional Korea, modernity was in the form of unmodernity, since modernity did not blossom in 
its native environment. 
Colonial Korea experienced a form of undermodernity, as indigenous modernity was negated 
and deformed by Japanese imperialism.11 During that time, modernity in Korea was initiated and 
imposed by imperial Japanese occupiers. The subjugated Korean people were forced to abandon 
or despise their own culture and several thousand years of tradition; Korea’s own culture was 
considered inferior to a Western one.
The first modern state experienced by Korean people under the rule of Japan resulted in enduring 
effects. A repressive state insensitive to the needs of the people in the territory was the essence 
of the experience. The state led by Japanese bureaucrats and some Korean collaborators acted 
independently from the people; the state set up agendas without taking into consideration 
existing traditions. For example, new cities and railways that were built to connect Japan to 
Manchuria through the Korean peninsula ignored traditional transportation systems, resulting in 
the decay of traditional cities.
A strong state resulted in a weak civil society. Even though Japanese rule dismantled a large 
part of traditional Korean life, it did not eliminate traditional power elites. Japanese rulers 
preserved remnants of Korea’s traditional dominant class, termed Yangban, by guaranteeing their 
traditional landlord status. Though some resisted against Japanese colonial rule, some Korean 
literati class collaborated to preserve their power. As a consequence, Korea’s old Confucian 
ruling class and other related traditional elements of Korean culture, such as paternalism, were 
preserved. 
The legacy of this first encounter with the modernity of a strong, independent state survived 
even after independence in 1945.12 The capitalist South Korean state used the threat of 
communist North Korea to successfully justify its near absolute power. The Korean War in 1950 
consolidated the power of the state over civil society. Furthermore, the survival of the Japanese 
collaborators after liberation was a negative influence on the growth of civil society. By building 
an alliance with the United States and presenting themselves as anti-communist leaders, the 
Japanese collaborators used every opportunity to maintain their power in South Korea. This 
presence of a strong state paired with a lack of independent civil leaders caused Korea’s civil 
society to remain dormant for more than 20 years.13
The growth of civil society in Korea was repressed under the guise of anti-communism, causing 
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the realization of democracy to be repressed. The government claimed that democracy and 
human rights should be limited for the sake of growth—“Growth First, Democracy Later” was 
its slogan. As such, labor unions continued to be under the strong control of a heavy-handed 
government. The leaders of the 1960 military coup disbanded the national labor union and 
reorganized it with leaders they appointed. In 1980, the state changed the form of unions from 
an industrial union system to a company union system, causing workers to become fragmented 
and divided by companies to this day. In a sense, this lack of solidarity among workers first 
originated from the strong state, which can be traced back to the start of modernization under 
Japanese rule.
Considering Korea’s history, its current modernity should be a variant of Western modernity 
combined with dysmodernity on the negative line of the spectrum and eumodernity on 
the positive side. However, it is my contention that it is too simple to approach this as a 
dichotomy of tradition and modernity to explain the complex process of the constitution and 
reconstitution of modernity in Korea. By undoing exclusive binarism between tradition and 
modernity or between modernity and postmodernity, a better understanding of the underlying 
nature of modernity in Korea — having gone through ‘traditional unmodernity,’ ‘colonial 
undermodernity,’ and ‘Western dysmodernity and eumodernity’—can be reached. This will allow 
us to deconstruct recent Korean modernity and search for alternatives to Western modernity.
There are two recent cases that can be used to comprehend the intricate characteristics of 
Korean modernity: the smash hit song ‘Gangnam Style,’ which demonstrates the brighter side 
of modernity, and the tragic sinking of the Sewol ferry, which shows the darker side. The music 
video of the song, ‘Gangnam Style’ has been YouTube’s most watched video since November 
24, 2012 and has forced YouTube to update its website code to allow it to accommodate larger 
numbers of viewers.14 
The popularity of Psy’s ‘Gangnam Style’ is a worthy offspring of Korean modernity. Psy was 
born into an affluent family in Korea and raised in a good neighborhood. His father attended elite 
schools in Korea, which secured him lucrative jobs and continued wealth. Most of his father’s 
generation could not have even imagined studying abroad due to the prevalent poverty in Korea; 
however, the “wealth” of Psy’s family gave him a chance to study music at the Berklee College 
of Music in Boston, USA, where he was influenced by the music and performance strategies of 
Freddie Mercury of Queen and other rock bands. Buoyed by economic success in Korea, many 
Korean students had opportunities to study abroad after the 1990s by paying expensive tuition 
and living costs. Psy was one of them. 
During Psy’s early days, his performances were controversial, as his songs were considered 
too provocative in Korea. However, his continued efforts, backed by his education from a 
prestigious American music college, helped him overcome these initial problems. Another factor 
that contributed to his survival in Korea was Korean society’s fast acceptance of American 
culture; Korean society could not have put up with his ‘vulgar’ performances just 30 years ago, 
but modernity in Korea had taken over quickly to accommodate Psy from a cultural aspect.
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The Sewol ferry tragedy is an example of the dark side of Korean modernity because it is closely 
related to the success of Korean modernity. Korea took many shortcuts to achieve economic 
success since the 1960s.15 The Sewol was the name of the passenger cargo ship that traveled 
between Incheon, a major port city near Korea’s capital city, Seoul, and Jeju Island, the most 
popular vacation spot in Korea. The ferry, which was used to transport essential goods that 
were needed on the island, could carry 921 passengers, 130 cars and 60 5-ton trucks and was 
almost 20 years old when it was originally imported from Japan. The outdated ship, which was 
initially banned from being imported due to warnings of instability by the maritime office, was 
allowed through due to policy changes made by the last administration as part of an economic 
stimulus package. However, the Korean government and the ferry company took this risk for 
yet another economic gain. To make matters worse, the ship was illegally modified to increase 
its profitability by having the ship take on more weight than it was able to safely carry. Without 
proper inspections and enforcement of regulations, the ship was exposed to dangerous levels 
of risk that would cause irreversible damage. Furthermore, the crew was not properly trained 
for emergency situations and the public office neglected safety inspections. The Korean Coast 
Guard, the final safety net, was also not adequately equipped or trained to save passengers on 
the ship. On April 16, the Sewol, weighed down by illegal bulky containers that were against 
regulations, capsized in the Yellow Sea, leaving its passengers—many of whom were students 
from Danwon High School—little chance for survival. The ferry company violated laws and 
took risks to increase profits while bureaucrats shared cozy relationships with business partners 
and neglected their obligation to serve and protect the people.
These two cases demonstrate that modernity, like the two faces of Janus, has a bright side and 
a dark side (Alexander 2013). Korea’s successes and failures are closely interconnected; as 
Korea becomes more modern, more problems will arise, such as mass-scale disasters, deepening 
inequality and widespread social unrest. 
IV. Major Features of Capitalist Development
Korean modernity started with the unexpected meeting with Western modernity as discussed 
earlier in this paper. While forced and passive modernity ended after liberation in 1945, the 
colonial experience endured and influenced Korea’s attempt to achieve modernity. Therefore, 
Korea’s trajectory toward modernity differs from other societies. The driving force of 
modernization came from the state and was led by elites, and the all-out attempt to achieve 
development in a short time shaped the characteristics of Korean modernity. 
A. The Limits of Vertical Modernization
In order to examine the similarity and dissimilarity of the process and outcome of development, 
the characteristics of conditions before development should be examined in a comparative 
perspective. The concept of vertical and horizontal modernization theory is useful to show the 
contrasting characteristics of before and after the start of development in Korea (Lim 2001, 79).
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The driving force of horizontal modernization tends to come from the bottom, the people, 
whereas the driving force of vertical modernization tends to come from the top, the elites. In 
the former situation, as the subjugated bourgeois are formed, the laissez faire state appears and 
civil liberties expand. Through representative democracy, class compromising capitalism is 
developed. In the latter form, under the protection of the interventionist state, there exists the 
cooperative bourgeois dependent on the state as well as denied civil liberties. In this process, 
some classes, most notably the working class, are excluded in the policy making process. 
Generally, the process of horizontal modernization is relatively free from the world system and 
countries with horizontal modernization have experienced endogenous development; however, 
the process of vertical modernization is generally bound and dependent on the world system and 
shows exogenous development. Most countries seeking vertical modernization have experienced 
a period of colonialization (Lim 2001, 78-80).
The role of the state in modernization is evident in late development and civil society is coerced 
in order to create consensus for resource mobilization to aid development. These late developers 
stress the importance of developmental values such as growth, efficiency and government 
control over values such as equality, equity and autonomy of civil society. As a consequence, 
vertical development can penetrate into society. However, it lacks the ability to make a social 
integration. 
The path and results of development depend on how late developing countries, vying to catch 
up with early developers, attempt to develop themselves using late-development techniques 
while under the constraints of the international economic system. Later-developing countries 
can take advantage of the experiences and technology of advanced developing countries. They 
can also minimize errors in every field of development, such as planning, education, training, 
mobilization of resources and investment. As one of these countries, Korea took advantage of 
later developers and succeeded in economic development. Its GNP grew from 1.3 billion dollars 
in 1953 to 1,304 billion dollars in 2013. GNP per capita also grew from 67 dollars in 1953 to 
25,973 dollars in 2013 (Figures 2 and 3).
Later-developing countries, however, also face many difficulties, such as undergoing pressure 
and control from advanced developing countries in market accessibility, international finance 
and technology and feeling that they lag far behind the advanced countries. Wallerstein (1991, 
115-116) argues that this phenomenon is not restricted to capitalist countries, as socialist bloc 
countries have also had an inability to solve inequality due to their obsession with development 
of goals aimed at catching up with advanced developed countries.16 
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Figure 2. GNP Growth in South Korea.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System, accessed on October 19, 2014.
Figure 3. GNP Growth Per Capita in South Korea.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System, accessed on October 19, 2014.
Not many late developing countries have succeeded in vertical modernization. Japan, Germany 
and the United States are exceptions. Japan utilized the advantages of late development and 
Germany and the United States did not experience much difficulty from the world system. These 
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three countries were imperialists in the era of capitalist expansion managing their colonies or 
quasi colonies.
The historical and structural position of Korea indicates that it is almost impossible for Korea 
to advance to a central position in the world system.17 Korea achieved its independence in 1945 
in the midst of an intensifying cold war and then soon experienced the division of the country 
into warring North and South Korea, making it inevitable that Korea would become strongly 
dependent on the world system. Even though Korea advanced to a semi-peripheral position, 
relative to other peripheral countries, it still depends on the countries at the core. Therefore, there 
is a clear limit on the extent to which Korea can become a member of the advanced capitalist 
countries.
B. Condensed Development: Democracy, Economic Growth and Welfare
Korean development since its liberation from Japanese occupation can be called condensed 
development.18 Fast, late-late development by vertical modernization has been extremely 
condensed and has created a complex, unbalanced and uneven society. The coexistence of 
old and new, along with the mixture of various domestic and foreign elements, is prevalent 
in Korea—urban with rural, the rich with the poor, agriculture with industry, old and young 
generations, and males and females are such examples. The stark difference between various 
fields of society creates strain and conflict among groups. This is the result of development; it 
creates a contradictory situation of developmental dynamics and conflict. Korea has achieved 
remarkable economic development as seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3 above; however, it also 
created considerable inequality, as its Gini coefficient showed in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Change of Gini coefficient in Korea.*
Year Market Income (before tax)
Disposable In-
come (after tax)
1990 0.266 0.256
1995 0.259 0.251
2000 0.279 0.266*
2005 0.306 0.287**
2010 0.341 0.310***
2013 0.336 0.302
*For urban households with more than 2 members (Between 1990 to 2002) 
**For non-rural households with more than 2 members (Between 2003 to 2005) 
***For all households 
Source: The Statistics Korea, e-Narajipo, accessed on October 19, 2014.
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This growth of inequality will certainly create social conflict. One of the conventional ways to 
deal with this problem is to increase welfare spending; however, the budget is extremely limited 
as seen in Table 2. An international comparison demonstrates that Korea is lagging behind in 
welfare spending as well (Figure 4).
Table 2. Public Welfare Expenditure in Korea.  
(unit: billion won)
Year 1990 2000 2005 2010 2011
Total Expenditure 5,398* 29,084 56,297 107,202 112,894
Percent to 
GDP
All 2.82 4.82 6.51 9.14 9.14
Pension for the Elderly 0.61 1.25 1.46 2.08 2.1
Survivor’s benefit 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.27
Worker’s inability to Pay 0.29 0.38 0.54 0.49 0.49
Public Health 1.53 2.18 3 4.12 4.08
Family 0.03 0.11 0.26 0.79 0.94
Active Labor Market 
Programs 0.03 0.38 0.12 0.43 0.37
Unemployment - 0.08 0.2 0.31 0.29
Misc. 0.18 0.27 0.7 0.67 0.6
Source: The Statistics Korea, e-Narajipo, accessed on October 19, 2014.
Korea can be defined as displaying a combination of excessive development, distorted 
development and lack of development. For example, economic development resulted in 
shrinking the first sector, overgrowing the third sector and enlarging the second sector. Third 
sector growth is heavily indebted to not only growth in the formal sector but also to growth in 
the informal sector that is prevalent by the low-paying jobs. In the second sector, technology-
intensive industry and labor-intensive industry display a large discrepancy in profit, wage, 
working conditions and more. Some sub-sectors in manufacturing also show worsening 
conditions whereas other sub-sectors appear to be catching up with ones in advanced countries 
(Table 3). 
This situation results in a contradictory condition; quantitative growth does not ensure quality 
of life in Korea. Rapid economic development combined with a lag in democratic consolidation 
and implementation of the welfare state is Korea’s current place.19
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Figure 4. Public and private social expenditure in percentage of GDP in 2009.
Note: 2008 for Switzerland. Data for Israel refers to public expenditure only. Information on data for Israel: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.  
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) via www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm.
Table 3. Production Structure (%)*
Year
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing
Manufactur-
ing**
Electricity, 
gas and water 
supply
Construction Services
1975 29.1 18.5 1.3 5.1 44.3
1980 16 24.6 2.1 7.9 48
1985 13.3 26.7 2.9 6.9 49
1990 8.7 26.6 2.1 10.4 51.5
1995 6.2 26.7 2 10.1 54.6
2000 4.6 28.3 2.5 6.9 57.3
2005 3.3 27.5 2.3 7.6 59
2010 2.6 30.3 2 6.3 58.5
2013 2.6 31.1 2.1 5.8 58.2
* Reference year: 2005 ** Mining, Quarrying excluded. 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System, accessed on October 21, 2014.
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Seemingly conflicting organizational principles are intermingled—coexistence of collectivism 
and individualism, authoritarianism and calling for democracy, ritualism and pragmatism, and 
emotivism and rationalism. Often, this creates negative consequences such as collective egotism, 
mammonism and anti-moral behavior. This necessitates recursive development. Problems 
created by condensed development may be overturned by vertical modernization. The need 
for reflection to increase substantive rationality that Korea lacks in comparison to instrumental 
rationality cannot be overemphasized.
Past Korean development was based on an outward-oriented strategy with a growth-first policy 
using chaebols (Korean conglomerates). Bureaucrats were an essential force behind late-
late development, as they funneled foreign capital and technology to large companies. Small 
groups of companies and workers often described this method of development as “growth first, 
distribution later.” This resource mobilization mechanism based on coercion and repression was 
bound to be faced with a consistent legitimacy crisis. Therefore, the mechanism changed to one 
based on consensus. It went into transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic 
one.
The condensed and rushed Korean development can be labeled as “Juggernaut” (Giddens 
1990, 139). In the process, old and new values collide with each other in Korea, resulting in 
anomie—speed and achievement are valued over safety and procedure. Korea’s fast capitalist 
industrialization is a manifestation of a risk-based society. The causes of the Korean economic 
crisis in 1997 were related to the factors that contributed to fast economic development—rushing 
through development without hesitation resulted in economic success at first and catastrophic 
failure soon afterward. Without considering long-term effects, Korea took up any opportunity 
that could contribute toward development, such as financial liberalization, a flexible labor 
market, and building massive nuclear power plants. Financial liberalization without a proper 
monitoring system has been considered a major cause of the 1997 financial crisis. Labor market 
reform created a large number of temporary workers, threatening social stability and long-
term labor market performance. Scandals over building and maintaining 23 nuclear power 
plants continues to raise questions about whether Korea has the ability to use nuclear power 
without terminating itself. The current situation is a testament to the fact that the transition to 
an industrial society in Korea lacks a self-regulating mechanism. Crisis in development shows 
that the future of Korea is unpredictable and very risky. A more perilous financial meltdown, 
severe social unrest, and deadly accidents in nuclear power plants could happen at any time. 
The first step to coping with a risk-based society should be to start by questioning the over-
confidence in modern civilization and science. The causes of accident and disaster are not only 
physical and natural ones but also social and political ones. Therefore, the answer to the current 
developmental crisis can be found in the dismantlement and reorganization of the concept of 
development. Development is a Western idea imported by the East. Contrary to the experience 
in the West, the development history in the East is strewn with the devastation of nature and 
society. This experience demands Korea find a way to harmonize the relationship between nature 
and man and to find an ideal for a value- laden development. 
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V. Korean Experience as an Emerging Modernity: A ‘Quasi-Modernity’ 
Korea has experienced a radical and drastic societal change over the past five decades. The 
country has undergone an unprecedented rate of modernization within the time span of 60 
years, a process that took Western European countries nearly two centuries. Accordingly, the 
modernization process in the areas of economy, politics, society and culture has been so abrupt 
that I have characterized it as ‘condensed capitalist development.’ 
In a Habermasian sense, modernization in Korea can be defined as what he has termed an 
‘unfinished project.’ The country has failed to build up a unified nation-state that can provide a 
necessary condition for launching independent industrialization and total democratization. The 
national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign capital, technology and resources because 
of its functional incompleteness and due to the division of the country. Despite the inauguration 
of four civilian governments with party alternation, democratic institutions and norms are not 
rooted strongly enough to bring about government accountability and true representation. In 
terms of dependent industrialization and partial democratization, Korea has developed a unique 
type of modernity that embraces both the possibility and limitation of capitalist development. 
This is exemplified by Korea’s unfinished modernization that is dependent on capital 
accumulation, a rent-seeking market economy, a formal democratic procedure and an immature 
civil society, among others. 
It is tempting to say that Korean modernity is not ‘fake-modernity’ per se but closer to ‘quasi-
modernity’ (Lim 2001, 88-90). Korea’s economic and political achievements can hardly be 
denied but they should also be properly weighed against their limitations. Although on the 
surface Korea looks modern, it is far from being modernized. I can make a couple of points here 
regarding the underlying nature of modernity in Korea over the past fifty years. 
First, Korean modernity is not evenly distributed in the areas of economy, politics, society and 
culture. The economy, politics, society and culture have differentiated from one another in an 
unequal and unbalanced way. Social differentiation has not proceeded to increase the relative 
autonomy of economy, politics, society and culture. This has yielded tension and cleavage 
among economy, politics, society and culture. In fact, industrialization has presided over 
democratization, resulting in a gap between democratic ideals and development politics. Social 
and political tension can be felt among the members of society over the values of freedom, 
growth, distribution and environment. Regional, generational and class cleavage is also a 
manifestation of uneven modernization. 
Second, Korean modernity is multilayered in that traditional, modern and postmodern 
parameters stand together. The development of economy, politics and society has been a process 
of intermixture among these different attributes. Even in individual areas of economy, politics, 
society, and culture, these different attributes are mixed up to produce disharmonies and clashes. 
For instance, authoritarianism and equalitarianism, connectionism and universalism, formalism 
and pragmatism, and collectivism and individualism all stand as pairs that cannot be separated in 
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the behaviors of Korean citizens. Figuratively speaking, an average Korean can be said to have a 
‘Western crust but a Confucian core.’ There is a big divide between the ways of thinking and the 
ways of living. 
Now I would like to reflect on the underlying nature of modernity in Korea. Korean modernity 
is a complex mixture of different kinds of modernities. It is composed of heterogeneous 
and competing cultural and institutional elements of traditional unmodernity, colonial 
undermodernity and Western modernity. There can be found the so-called synchronic existence 
of dissynchronics. Basically, the dominant form of Korean modernity has been framed by 
Western modernity, with a variety of Chinese Confucian, Japanese, American and European 
elements. They are intermingled in such a way as to undermine the self-identity of Korean 
modernity. This might be a natural result of exogenous modernization experienced by Korea. 
Globalization is likely to make further effects on the weakening of the self-identity of Korean 
modernity. 
VI. Summary and Discussion
This paper has tried to present a broad picture of modernity in Korea. Diachronically, Korea 
has undergone traditional unmodernity, colonial undermodernity and Western modernity in 
the process of modernization. There have been continuities as well as changes among them. 
The dominant form of Korean modernity has been framed by a Western one. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the self-identity of Korean modernity is weak, mainly because 
Korean modernity is a mixture of heterogeneous and conflicting institutional and cultural 
programs, with native Korean, Chinese Confucian, Japanese, American and European elements. 
Modernity can be perceived as a multiple civilizational project. As a specific historical 
social formation, Korean modernity has changed over time with a continuous constitution 
and reconstitution of its cultural and institutional contours. In order to thoroughly grasp the 
underlying nature of modernity in Korea, I observed the historical developments of tradition, 
modernity, and postmodernity, which have interacted with one another in the process of capitalist 
development. After this process has been understood, I reflect upon how they have helped to 
shape unique configurations of modernity in Korea. 
There are, however, more unanswered than answered questions. Among other inquiries, I 
still cannot locate the relative place of Korean modernity among Western and non-Western 
modernities. At this juncture, I would like to suggest three areas of future research that are 
interrelated: a comparative study of variations in Western modernity, a case study of East Asian 
modernity and an in-depth study of continuities and changes in Korean modernity.
As a Korean saying goes, “the most local is the most global.” This saying can be interpreted 
as meaning universality cannot exist without particularity and vice versa. It is instructive 
to argue that there is something inherently universal in Korean modernity from a multiple 
modernities perspective. I would like to conclude my discussion by challenging future scholars 
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to comprehend Western tradition and modernity from a viewpoint of Korean tradition and at the 
same time to comprehend Korean tradition and modernity from an angle of Western modernity.
(Endnotes)
1  Hereafter Korea refers to South Korea unless otherwise noted.
2  See Wager (2012) Chapter 3. 
3  Postmodernism can be initially observed in a wide range of fields such as art, architecture, literature, film, 
philosophy, cultural theory, social theory and more. In this regard, Callinicos (1990, 2) points out that “the 
producers of this discourse....offered definitions which were mutually inconsistent, internally contradictory and/
or hopelessly vague.” 
4  From this line of thought, one sociologist titled his book, The Dark Side of Modernity. (Alexander 2013)
5  I differentiated modernization theory and dependency theory as two competing paradigms in the study 
of (former) Third World development in that the former includes sociological modernization theory, neo-
classical economic theory, and political development theory, and the latter embraces Latin American theory of 
dependencia, world-system theory, and theory of peripheral capitalism. 
6  Some of the good works in this line of post-development thinking are Sachs (1992), Schurman (1993), Escobar 
(1995), Rahnema and Bawtree (1997), and Munck and O’Hearn (1999).
7  For a detailed discussion of this, please refer to Robertson (1995), Therbon (1995), and other articles appeared 
in Featherstone, Lash and Robertson (1995). 
8  Kim (2015) overviews the timeline of East Asian modernity including Korea.
9  From a post-colonial discourse, Cho Han (1994) has pioneered in criticizing academic dependency of Korean 
social sciences embedded in Orientalism. 
10  I would like to add two dimensions of modernity that is eumodernity as a possibility and dysmodernity as a 
limitation. 
11  Colonial undermodernity might have more advantages than colonial modernity, since it can capture not only 
limitations of colonial industrialization motivated by Japanese war-efforts but also wrongdoings of Japanese 
policies in enforcing cultural and social assimilation in Korea. In a sense, colonial modernity is a contradictory 
terminology. Concerning colonial modernity, see Shin and Robinson (1999). 
12  Alabi (1972, 59-60) reported that post-colonial societies developed a unique system with autonomous role of the 
state apparatus differing from Europeans societies. 
13  This state, ironically, became an important foundation of economic success ensuing its attempt to develop 
economy (Evans 1995). Korean bureaucrats established economic development plans and successfully 
implemented them to bring in economic success. Bureaucrats were embedded in the business and controlled 
business leaders to devote themselves to the economic development. All the resources were directed to the 
development with strict guidance by the state apparatus.
14  See The New York Times, June 9, 2014.
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15  The characteristics of this development are discussed more in the following chapter 4. 
16  Korea could have been an exception until late 1980 but since then inequality in Korea has risen considerably as 
seen in Table 1.
17  Liberals and Marxists share this assessment on this. Thurow (1992, 204) showed that Japan was the only 
country to advance to the center between the 19th century and the 20th century. Chase-Dunn (1983, 80-81) 
considered nine countries including Japan, Soviet Russia, Finland, Norway, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand and 
Australia. Other than Japan, Soviet Russia and Finland had already moved into the center during 19th century. 
18  Cho (1994) coined the term, condensed growth, to depict the rapid economic development in Korea since 
the early 1960’s and made the term popular; however, Professor Okawa in Japan had already used a similar term, 
compressed growth, to summarize Japanese economic development before the World War II.
19  Korea stopped improving its political freedom as documented in the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
Index, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/south-korea-0#.VEMkNk1xmCg. For instance: 
Freedom, Civil Liberties and Political Rights in Korea
1998 2005 2010 2013 2014
Freedom Rating 2 1 1.5 1.5 2
Civil Liberties 2 2 2 2 2
Political Rights 2 1 1 1 2
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